(Observer effect / Complementarity principle / Complementary descriptions)
In this section, Feynman discusses Proposition
A, uncertainty principle, and logical tightropes in communicating quantum
mechanics. However, the three main points of the section could be observer
effect, complementarity principle, and complementary descriptions in quantum
mechanics.
1. Observer effect:
“Here is what we see: every time
that we hear a “click” from our electron detector (at the backstop), we also
see a flash of light either near hole 1 or near
hole 2, but never both at once! And we observe the same
result no matter where we put the detector. From this observation we
conclude that when we look at the electrons we find that the electrons go
either through one hole or the other. Experimentally, Proposition A is
necessarily true (Feynman et
al., 1963, p. 37–7).”
According to Feynman, Proposition A—"each electron either goes
through hole 1 or hole 2"—becomes true only under experimental conditions that forces the electron to choose a definite path. This reveals a deeper truth: the validity of
Proposition A is dependent on the act of observation. In the absence of observation, the electron is described
by a wavefunction representing a superposition of paths, leading to
interference. When an
observation is made, the act of measurement restricts the wavefunction
to a new quantum state (a different function), allowing the electron to exhibit
particle-like behavior and follow a specific path—either through slit 1 or slit
2. This transition from
wave-like to particle-like behavior upon observation is often attributed to the
observer effect, a concept sometimes linked to Heisenberg’s microscope. It
challenges classical notions of objective reality, illustrating that the
properties of quantum systems are not pre-determined but emerge through
interaction with the apparatus.
“You remember that
when we discussed the microscope we pointed out that, due to the wave
nature of the light, there is a limitation on how close two spots can be and
still be seen as two separate spots. This distance is of the order of the
wavelength of light. So now, when we make the wavelength longer than the
distance between our holes, we see a big fuzzy flash when the light is
scattered by the electrons (Feynman et al., 1963, p. 37–9).”
Traditionally, physicists would use Heisenberg’s
microscope to explain the uncertainty principle involved in the experiment.
However, Feynman’s mention of microscope is related to Rayleigh criterion,
which states the minimum angular resolution of an image-forming system.
Notably, the experiment could be analyzed using the concepts of visibility
and distinguishability: 1. Visibility refers to the clarity of
the interference pattern, with high visibility
indicating sharp fringes and low visibility indicating blurred or no patterns. 2. Distinguishability refers to the ability to
determine which hole a particle passed through. There is a quantitative
relation, sometimes known as distinguishability-visibility relation, which
expresses a trade-off between the visibility of interference pattern and the
distinguishability of the particle’s path.
2. Complementarity principle:
“He proposed, as a general principle, his uncertainty
principle, which we can state in terms of our experiment as follows: ‘It is
impossible to design an apparatus to determine which hole the electron passes
through, that will not at the same time disturb the electrons enough to destroy
the interference pattern’ (Feynman et al., 1963, p. 37–9).”
Feynman’s statement of the uncertainty principle suggests
that the principle arises from the disturbance caused by the act of
measurement. Furthermore, it implies that the main problem is one of apparatus
design, but one may consider the possibility of determining the electron’s path
using an observation system (instead of physical apparatus). More important, the uncertainty principle is now
understood as intrinsic uncertainties
of quantum systems, that are independent of any disturbance. Bohr’s complementarity
principle offers an alternative explanation: we cannot observe both the wave
and particle properties simultaneously. When we observe the electron’s path (particle-like
behavior), the interference pattern (wave-like behavior) disappears, and vice
versa.
Feynman’s perspective is related to Bohr-Einstein
debates on the epistemological problems of quantum mechanics. In Bohr’s (1949) words,
“[I]t is only the circumstance that we are presented with a choice of either
tracing the path of a particle or observing interference effects, which allows
us to escape from the paradoxical necessity of concluding that the behavior of
an electron or a photon should depend on the presence of a slit in the
diaphragm through which it could be proved not to pass. We have here to do with
a typical example of how the complementary phenomena appear under mutually
exclusive experimental arrangements and are just faced with the impossibility,
in the analysis of quantum effects, of drawing any sharp separation between an
independent behavior of atomic objects and their interaction with the measuring
instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena
occur (p. 46).” Remarkably, Bohr explains the experiment using the complementarity principle. Complementarity is the concept
that a single entity can exhibit different (or seemingly contradictory)
properties depending on the perspectives or context in which it is observed.
Strictly speaking, Feynman’s statement is not a
general formulation of the uncertainty principle but rather a specific
application to the double-slit experiment. An alternative phrasing of the
principle, avoiding terms like “apparatus” and "disturb," might be:
It is impossible to determine which hole the electron passes through without
affecting the visibility of the interference pattern. Specifically, the distinguishability-visibility
relation in a modern
double slit experiment may be expressed as: D2 + V2 ≤ 1 (Jaeger, 2007). This inequality means that as path
distinguishability (D) increases, the visibility (V) of the interference
pattern must decrease, and vice versa. In the double-slit experiment, when D =
1 (complete distinguishability or complete path knowledge), V = 0, meaning no
interference pattern will appear. Conversely, when D = 0 (no path knowledge), V
= 1, meaning a full interference pattern.
3.
Complementary descriptions:
“If one
looks at the holes or, more accurately, if one has a piece of apparatus which
is capable of determining whether the electrons go through hole 1 or
hole 2, then one can say that it goes either through
hole 1 or hole 2. But, when one does not try
to tell which way the electron goes, when there is nothing in the experiment to
disturb the electrons, then one may not say that an electron
goes either through hole 1 or hole 2. If one does say that, and
starts to make any deductions from the statement, he will make errors in the
analysis. This is the logical tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to
describe nature successfully (Feynman et al., 1963, p. 37–9).”
Feynman’s “logical tightrope” could be related to complementary
descriptions, which include classical and quantum descriptions. Proposition A—"each
electron either goes through hole 1 or hole 2" is a classical description,
which can be determined by an experiment. Perhaps Feynman could have included Proposition
B: “each electron exists as a superposition of different states (or possible paths),” which is a
quantum description. This describes the
electron’s quantum state, where its path remains undefined until measured. In
essence, the classical description captures the electron’s particle-like
behavior, emphasizing a definite path when observed, while the quantum
description highlights its wave-like nature, characterized by an indefinite
path when unobserved. This duality illustrates the principle of
complementarity, where the wave and particle descriptions are not contradictory
but dependent on the experimental setup.
In the Audio Recordings* [39 min: 30 sec] of this lecture, Feynman says something like: “The world must be entirely quantum mechanical. It cannot be half classical and half quantum mechanical. If, for example, shmootrinos, a new particle, would all go exactly like waves according to classical physics, we can make any intensity we want. Then, we can just use them to watch electrons, we can cut the intensity down because they don’t have the rules of quantum mechanics, then it would be a paradox...” Feynman also used the word shmootrinos in his lecture on gravitation delivered to advanced graduate students. In Feynman’s (1995) words, “These we might think of as photons or gravitons or neutrinos, or maybe some new particles, some shmootrinos which don't worry about baryon conservation. When they meet another shmootrino dropping in from the other side with opposite momentum, these can have enough energy to create a hydrogen atom.” This playful invention serves to emphasize the necessity of quantum mechanical rules, suggesting the inconsistency that would arise if a new (classical?) particle existed in a quantum world.
*The Feynman Lectures Audio Collection: https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/flptapes.html
“In
Fig. 37–5 we have tried to indicate schematically
what happens with large-scale objects. Part (a) of the figure shows the
probability distribution one might predict for bullets, using quantum
mechanics. The rapid wiggles are supposed to represent the interference pattern
one gets for waves of very short wavelength. Any physical detector, however,
straddles several wiggles of the probability curve, so that the measurements
show the smooth curve drawn in part (b) of the figure (Feynman et al., 1963, p. 37–10).”
It
might seem surprising that the double-slit experiment involving bullets could
produce an interference pattern as shown in Fig. 37–5(a). This can be explained
by the de Broglie wavelength of bullets, which is extremely small
compared to objects like electrons. The rapid wiggles in the interference
pattern predicted by quantum mechanics for bullets could be observed if a
sufficiently large number of bullets is fired under highly controlled
conditions. In practical experiments, however, real-world factors such as
slight imperfections in the slit edges (e.g., sharp versus smooth edges) and
the granularity of the bullet impacts would likely introduce significant noise,
obscuring the interference pattern. If the separation between the two slits
were increased, the probability distribution might display two distinct peaks
instead of one. Feynman’s
analysis also implicitly assumes that the bullets are highly correlated—that
is, they possess nearly identical energies or de Broglie wavelengths. Without this
assumption, the underlying quantum mechanical effects would be overwhelmed by
classical randomness.
Review
Questions:
1.
Would you explain the uncertainty principle using the
observer effect? (Do you agree with Feynman’s statement of
uncertainty principle)?
2.
Would you explain the double slit experiment using the uncertainty principle or
complementarity principle?
3.
How would you explain the logical tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to describe
nature successfully?
The
moral of the lesson: The test of
a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind
at the same time, and still retain the ability to function (Fitzgerald, 2009).
References:
1. Bohr, N. (1949). Discussion
with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics, In N. Bohr, Philosophical
Writings of Niels Bohr, 3 vols. Woodbridge: Ox Bow Press.
2. Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., &
Sands, M. (1963). The Feynman
Lectures on Physics, Vol I: Mainly mechanics, radiation, and
heat. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
3. Feynman, R. P., Morinigo, F. B., & Wagner, W. G. (1995). Feynman Lectures
on gravitation (B. Hatfield, ed.).
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
4. Jaeger, G. (2007). Quantum information. New
York: Springer.
5. Fitzgerald, F. S. (2009). The
crack-up. New Directions Publishing.